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WHY THE PRUDENT MAN?
ALEC B.STEVENSON*

In the law relating to fiduciary investments there has been going on
of recent years something very like a revolution. One needs an excuse
for adding anything at all to the very considerable volume of comment
about the Prudent Man Rule for trust investment. However, failing
the hope that anything really new may be said, there does remain a
persistent belief that the rationale of what has happened has been
somewhat oversimplified.
In the interests of perspective, accordingly, it might be serviceable
if we were first (and briefly) to re-examine some of the history of
the more dramatic highlights of the revolution, but if next we were
to attend somewhat more fully to phases of the Rule in daily practice
which we may assert to have had quite as much to do with its wider
adoption as have some of the more publicized causes.
The actual trend of events has been dramatic enough, overturning
in state after state, as it has in a comparatively few years, the legal
embodiments of a trust investment philosophy which had long dominated the greater part of the area and population of the United States.
As recently as 1939 there were only nine jurisdictions in which the
trustee, either by law or statute, enjoyed that freedom of choice and
concomitant acute necessity for the exercise of sound discretion which
characterize the Prudent Man Rule. Yet by November, 1953, there
were only twelve or fifteen states (depending on how the statutes
are classified) in which, whether or not diluted, whether or not applying to all kinds of fiduciaries, the rule (or something very like it) was
not the law, either by fiat of the legislature or decision of the bench.1
Why, between 1939 and 1953, did so many states after decades under
the respectable and comfortable umbrella of a legislatively defined
list of trustee investments, abandon that shelter? Or, to put it another
way, why is it that after 123 years Justice Putnam's pungent Yankee
precepts, soundly and drily laid down like Massachusetts salt cod, have
only now, so to speak, gained elsewhere the acclaim and observance
they have long enjoyed in his native state? The full answers to these
questions lie, to be sure, in the whole social and economic history of the
United States. Various parts of the story have been treated ably and
at length elsewhere,2 and neither the scope nor the purposes of this
* Partner, Vance, Sanders & Company, Boston. Formerly Vice President
and Trust Officer, First American National Bank, Nashville, Tennessee.
1. For a check list of relevant statutes and decisions, see Appendix, infra
p. 91.
2. E.g., Price, Fallacy of Statutory Investment Standards, 73 TRusTs &
EsTATEs 71 (1941); Shattuck, The Development of the Prudent Man Rule for
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paper would permit the exhaustive treatment they should receive.

Perhaps the simplest answer -and one not too wide of the markis to say that-only in the last twenty years or so did a series of events
occur and conditions arise which rather clearly indicated the inadequacy of the "legal list," or "New York" trust investment rule. Meanwhile the Prudent Man Rule had not been found wanting in ability

to adapt itself to and cope with
"new financial institutions and business customs, changed commercial
methods and practices, altered monetary usages and investment combinations." 3
Reference to the two leading cases will help to fill in the background. First, in the very famous case of Harvard College v. Amory,4
Justice Putnam, using only sixty-eight words, laid down what has
become recognized as the heart of the Prudent Man Rule:
"All that can be required of a trustee to invest, is, that he shall conduct
himself faithfully and exercise a sound discretion. He is to observe how
men of prudence, discretion and intelligence manage their own affairs, not
in regard to speculation, but in regard to the permanent disposition of
their funds, considering the probable income as well as the probable safety
of the capital to be invested." 5
Bearing in mind that the case involves examination, and eventual
approval of the propriety of, retention of and investment in shares of
banks, insurance companies and mill enterprises, at a time when the
weight of English trustee tradition was still heavy in favor of investment in debt rather than in ownership, the revolutionary character of
Justice Putnam's decision is apparent. Not less radical than the approval of share investment itself was the objective character of the
Rule enunciated. Reference to the quoted phrases discloses four highly
important principles, among others, to which the trustee must conform:
(1) It is not enough that the trustee have discretion, he must exercise it; that is, form judgment, and then act.
(2) The trustee cannot take for granted what the investment practice of prudent men may be; he must investigate.
Fiduciary Investment in the United States in the Twentieth Century, 12 Omo
ST. L.J. 491 (1951); Shattuck, The Massachusetts Prudent Man in Trust Investments, 25 B.U.L. REV. 307 (1945); Shattuck, The Massachusetts Trustees'
Investment Rule, Its Virtues and Defects, 21 TRUST BurL. No. 9, p. 10 (May
1942); Torrance, Legal Background, Trends, and Recent Developments in the
Investment of Trust Funds, 17 LAw & CoNTEMP. PROS. 128 (1952); White and
Lawres, The Modernizationof Legal Lists, 5 LAw & CONTEMP. PROS. 386 (1938).
3. Kimball v. Whitney, 233 Mass. 321, 331, 123 N.E. 665, 666 (1919).
4. 9 Pick. 446 (Mass. 1830).
5. Id. at 461.
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(3) The trustee cannot appraise as of equal interest and merit for
his purposes all the financial commitments of the prudent man;
he must consider only those not made as speculations.
(4) It is naturally assumed that a trustee will think of the safety of
the capital to be invested; Justice Putnam reminds him that impartiality between beneficiaries is his duty, and he must consider "probable income as well."
It was not unnatural that these results were reached in Massachusetts, a community then both socially more mature and financially
more sophisticated than most of the rest of the country. It was nearly
forty years before there arose in New York a case in which the court
flatly contradicted the basic assumption of HarvardCollege v. Amory,
which was, to quote a much more recent case, that
"the preservation of trust estates depends more upon the integrity, honesty
and business acumen of the trustees than it does upon arbitrary legal classification of securities wherein trust funds may be invested."6

In the New York case 7 there were factual elements of similarity to
HarvardCollege v. Amory, and also even in the language of the court
as to the requirement of prudence: it was only the scope of prudence
which the court narrowed. After paying tribute to the rule of prudence
in words closely paraphrasing those of Justice Putnam, after decrying
speculation, and after emphasizing the importance of the "preservation of the fund and the procurement of a just income therefrom," the
court then proceeded to disallow investment in shares of stock in the
following words:
"The moment the fund is invested in bank, or insurance, or railroad stock,
it has left the control of the trustees; its safety and the hazard, or risk
of loss, is no longer dependent upon their skill, care, or discretion, in its
custody or management, and the terms of the investment do not contemplate that it ever will be returned to the trustees.
"If it be said, that, at any time, the trustee may sell the stock, (which is
but another name for their interest in the property and business of the
corporation), and so re-possess themselves of the original capital, I reply,
that is necessarily contingent and uncertain; and so the fund has been
voluntarily placed in a condition of uncertainty .... -8
Justice Putnam was either more cynical or more perceptive in his
decision. He simply remarked, "Do what you will, the capital is at
hazard" 9
6. Rand v. McKittrick, 346 Mo. 466, 142 S.W.2d 29, 31 (1940).
7. King v. Talbot, 40 N.Y. 76 (1869).
8. Id. at 88-89.
9. Harvard College v. Amory, 9 Pick. 446, 461 (Mass. 1830).

1953]

PRUDENT MAN

Though much more was involved in King v. Talbot'0 than merely
a judicial preference for evidences of debt rather than evidences of
ownership in the trustee's portfolio, it was this aspect which drew the
most attention, and, as Torrance points out, "found reflection in the
laws favoring trust investments not only in New York but in a number
of other states."'"
Resulting statutes specified, often with the most elaborate detail,
precisely the investment formulae, ratios and fiscal standards by
which the "legal" trust investment was to be tested, or, in many cases,
empowered appropriate state authorities using such standards to publish lists of legal trust investments. Despite the fact that the legislative
wisdom was a wisdom after the event, the standards by which investment excellence was to be established eventually failed in practice,
though it was many years before the failure became apparent.
First, the great economic disaster of 1929-1933 shocked those who
put too much faith in the form of investment, since it wiped out values
of all kinds, bonds as well as stocks, and second, after 1933, in a more
prosperous economy, but one very different from any that had gone
before, the legal list philosophy failed, because its nature was to fail
to adjust itself rapidly enough to change conditions. In the long years
of growth and continent-taming from 1865 to the early 1900's the demand for capital had resulted, in the main, in liberal interest rates, and,
again in the main, the cost of living was not high. These were conditions
favorable to investment in debt: why risk 'equities when the rewards
were not sufficiently greater? But when, with the 1929-1933 debris still
littering the scene, there followed a systematic and artificial lowering
of interest rates, a systematic and artificial raising of commodity prices,
a systematic and punitive increase in the rate of income taxation, the
abandonment of the convertibility of currency into gold and the nullification of the gold-payment clauses in private and public debt, and by
legislation and court decision (especially in the railroad bankruptcy
cases) the evisceration of the preferred position of the mortgage creditor- when all these things happened, and high grade common stocks
were yielding twice or more as much as good bonds, is it any wonder
that trustees and income beneficiaries alike begin to ask for freedom
to choose?
Even in some of the legal list states trust institutions reported that
70% to 80% of trust instruments gave the trustee full discretion as
to investments, 12 and an American Bankers Association inquiry showed
similar indications. 13 And the changed attitude of testators and settlors
10. 40 N.Y. 76 (1869).
11. Torrance, supra note 2, at 130.
12. STEPHENSON, GILBERT T., STUDIES IN TRUST BUSINESS,
78 (Trust Division, American Bankers Ass'n, 1944).
13. 21 TRUST BULL. 13, 20 (1941).
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was discussed in a 1943 study by the Graduate School of Banking
of American Bankers Association, showing that they were very much
more interested in the welfare of their life beneficiaries than of their
remaindermen, even to the extent of granting their trustees power to
use principal for the life beneficiaries. 14
In New York itself, by 1950, the legislature had passed a limited 35%
Prudent Man amendment to the trust investment statutes. The amendment was inspired by a thorough study made by the Trust Division
of New York State Bankers Association. 15 It included a careful appraisal of the results of the New York legal list of trust investments,
and of the relative performance of trusts under restricted and unrestricted powers.
Some of the comments are illuminating.
"Inclusion of a bond in a legal list creates a strong presumption of Its
safety. We have seen that this presumption is not always justifled."10
"The legal list has not been notably more successful than the other
methods in selecting issues of better quality. It has demonstrated little
responsiveness to the broad trend of economy developments, and has
not been especially effective in warning of trouble to come .... nevertheless, over the years legal bonds have commanded a premium in the
market, with the result that investors were obliged to accept 1/8 to 1/4 of
1% less in yield when purchasing legal bonds as compared with bonds
of similar quality which were not eligible." [Italics supplied]I"
"Any official list requires frequent revision and legislative correction is
usually tardy."lB
"The concept of a legal list originating in New York State more than
fifty years ago, and involving publication of an official list for the guidance
of inexperienced trustees, was appropriate to a period of extremely meager
financial information. Today investment appraisals can be made on the
basis of access to sources of financial information which had not even
been imagined a half century ago ... successful investment experience
in a dynamic country like the United States depends largely on a perception of current trends and the ability to appraisethe significance of new
developments. This approach is the reverse of the concept of statutory
formulas for which the past is projected into the future regardless of
the circumstances prevailing." [Italics supplied] 19

The phrases italicized just above do not state but certainly imply
what is the real difficulty with the legal list approach, namely, the
inability of the trustee to do anything about the situation after he has
14. STEPEMNSON, op. cit. supra note 12, at 78.
15. REPORT OF THE TRUST INVESTMENT STUDY COMMITTEE, TRUST DIVIsIoN,
Nnw Yomx STATE BAxEm s Ass'x (1949).

16. Id. at 50.

17. Id. at 54.
18. Id. at 57.
19. Id. at 62-63.
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appraised "the significance of new developments." On the other harid,
the critics of the so-called excessive liberality of the Prudent Man,
Rule should remember that equally with the freedom it gives the
trustee to invest, for example, in common stocks when prudent, it
imposes the duty not to invest in them when such a course is not
prudent.
While the question of a just income for the life beneficiary has
been the focal point of much of the debate between proponents of
the two rules, back of this has lain, as is evident in the cases, the more
fundamental problem of the duty and the powers of the trustee under
changed and unforeseen conditions, and in emergencies and the like.
Consider the situation reported by the New York State Bankers Association, which made a study of a hypothetical trust restricted to New
York legals over a twenty-year period beginning in 1927. Beginning
annual income was $4700. It had dropped to $3800 by 1937 and to.
$2900 in 1949. The report says:
"if we assume that the income from such a trust is for the benefit of a
widow with two dependents, the present income, which is 40% lower
than that of twenty years ago, and 25% lower than that of 1937, must
meet a cost of living close to 70% higher than in 1937 and Federal taxes

ten times as high."20
To the unfortunate if hypothetical widow just mentioned, two
remedies were open, either to ask for the annual use of some of the
principal (if, happily, powers of encroachment existed in the trust
instrument), or to petition the court for a deviation from the invest-;
ment terms of the trust. Neither is a very good substitute for an
original grant of responsible discretionary powers to the trustee in the'
matter of investments, for in the latter event, as the cases show, the
attitudes of the courts vary widely and frequently are not sympathetic"'
to income beneficiaries. Nevertheless, if the trustor and his draftsman'
have been unimaginative and inflexible, and if the investment statutes
&ucliif
are likewise, then only the court can, in its discretion, say how
any, relief may be granted.
Thus, in 1927 a New Hampshire testator 21 executed a will, setting .up,
trusts which he directed were to be invested entirely in savings bank
deposits, at a time when the interest return on such deposits average
about 4.15%. In 1932, the year of the testator's death, the averag'."s
still around 4.1%, but by 1946 it had shrunk to 1.951%. The courtheid
that the circumstances amply justified deviation from the terms ofd
the will, but a deviation, it said, to be allov ed, only with respect to
20. Id. at 119.
21. Citizens' National Bank v. Morgan, 94 N.H. 284, 51 A.2d 841, 170 A.L.R.
1215 (1947).

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[ VOL. 7

the investment of enough of the corpus in other legal investments 22 to

make good the shrinkage of income. And, further, the court said:
"The aim is not to better the interests of the life tenants over and above
the provisions made for them but to prevent impairment of the gifts enjoyed by them at the establishment of the trust by the different, unforeseen circumstances, in so far as this can be done by investments authorized
by law for trustees .... It is true there is no allegation of need or suffering on the part of the life beneficiaries.... It is shown that these beneficiaries are losing substantially with respect to the gifts the testator provided for them. . . . The requirement that the funds must be invested
as stated by the statute ... sufficiently safeguards the remaindermen."23
24
The court was acting under a statute permitting deviation under
changed conditions, whether actual or "reasonably foreseeable," which
"would defeat or substantially impair the accomplishment of the pur-

poses of the trust."
The New Hampshire court said further,
"Substantially lower interest rates should be carefully considered by a
trustee and the court of equity as well as the factor of inflation. The one
as well as the other results in loss that is an impairment of the gifts of a
trust. It is true that the lower dividends of the savings banks affect only
the life tenants, but their rights must be protected as well as those of the
remaindermen."25
Not all courts have been as favorably disposed toward income beneficiaries, though one cannot on principle quarrel too violently with a
strict adherence to the terms of the trust, and to the best guess that
can be made as to the intent of the testator. At the same time, it is
well to remember, first, that in practice what the testator meant often
does not correspond with the meaning of his words (or his draftsman's
words)26 and, next, that the testator, as a layman, is thinking much
more of the most effective use of his property for the benefit of those
closest to him than, by either inclination or indeed awareness of the
situation at all, he is of the problems of construction of the trust
instrument that may arise after his death.
The courts are reluctant, and properly so, "to assume the role of
rewriting a will by substituting their judgment for that of its creator
at every suggestion of a trustee or beneficiary of a plan of administra22. The New Hampshire statute permits up to 50% of a trust estate to be
invested under the Prudent Man Rule. N.H. REv.LAws c. 363, § 17 (1942).
23. Citizens' National Bank v. Morgan, 94 N.H. 284, 51 A.2d 841, 843-44, 170
A.L.R. 1215 (1947). See also 2 ScOTT, TRUSTS § 167, pp. 840-41 (1939); RESTATEnENT, TRUSTS § 167(1) (1935).
24. N.H. REV. LAWS c. 371, § 4 (1942).
25. Citizens' National Bank v. Morgan, 94 N.H. 284, 51 A.2d 841, 844, 170
A.L.R. 1215 (1947).
26. In re Rayner, [1904] 1 Ch. 176, 180. See Schaefer, Intent of the Testator,
92 TausTs & ESTATES 716 (1953).
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tion thought to be better than the plan originally designated." 27 Nevertheless, one of the great difficulties in the legal list states has been that
even where relief was granted when the investment restrictions of the
trust instrument were more severe than those of the legal list, the
relief afforded has usually been inadequate, and this is for a good
reason, since it has been stated that
"Whether, in order to provide for an emergency, an equity court has
'power' or jurisdiction to authorize investments outside the designations
of a so-called 'mandatory' statute defining trust investments is a question
which does not appear as yet to have been squarely decided." "[Footnote
to text] In Re Muller (1935) 155 Misc 748, 280 NYS 345 . . . the court

stated that it knew of 'no power in any court to disregard the command
of the legislature' as to trust investments." 28

Even where the courts have had somewhat more latitude than in
New York, the results have not always been pleasing to the income
beneficiaries. In New Jersey relief was denied with the statement that
it is "not the province of this court to allow trustees to speculate in
stocks which might result in loss to the remaindermen." 29 And this
was said despite the existence of a statute empowering the court to
authorize and direct non-statutory investments, including common and
preferred stocks. In another New Jersey case the court felt that a
mere slight shrinkage in income from a trust, such as from $70,000
to $54,000, is not sufficient to establish that the purposes of the trust
may be defeated, and relief was denied with the statement:
"It appears that the sole purpose to be accomplished is to increase income
by investing in stocks that will produce more but will not be legals ...
In this case the whole situation was put upon the basis of economics, not
the necessity of the beneficiaries." 30

Again a New Jersey court, holding that statutes at inception of the
trust were controlling, refused permission to deviate, saying:
"The income from the principal of the trust has steadily decreased 'to
a point where it is only approximately 50 per cent of what it was in the
years immediately following the inception of the trust.
27. Wentworth, Deviations from Terms of Will, 92 TRusTs & ESTATES 720
(1953).
28. Note, 170 A.L.R. 1219, 1221 and n.15 (1947). The New York court appears
to have placed considerable reliance on Cruger v. Jones, 18 Barb. 467 (N.Y.
1854), which, however, involved not the question of investing outside the
statute but rather a requested permission for trustees to be allowed to mortgage
trust property, an action declared by statute to be void. See also In re Jones'
Will, 202 Minn. 187, 277 N.W. 899 (1938).
29. Bliss v. Bliss, 126 N.J. Eq. 308, 8 A.2d 705 (1939), aff' per curiam, 127
N.J. Eq. 20, 11 A.2d 13 (1940).
30. Reiner v. Fidelity Union Trust Company, 127 N.J. Eq. 377, 13 A.2d 291,
292-93, 128 A.L.R. 964 (1940), reversing 126 N.J. Eq. 78, 8 A.2d 175 (1939).
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"Vera Grace Osborne is almost entirely dependent upon her share of
True, the income is
the income for her maintenance and support. ....
presently affected but the security of the principal is intact for aught that
appears herein.... Shrinkage in income is not sufficient of itself to permit
the court's intervention upon the ground that the trust might be de3
feated." [Italics supplied] 1
In Minnesota the court refused a petition to allow investment under
the Prudent Man statute, passed since the death of the testator, and
referring to its own earlier construction of the testator's intent as
'6 classes of investments to be permitted, quoted with approval the
following statement:
"'A court will emphasize the ultimate intention of the trustor rather than
the interests of the beneficiaries, and the prime consideration is the preservation of the estate, and not merely the administration of the trust in
a way to produce a greater benefit for the beneficiaries.' "32
The court, applying this principle, found that
of
"There has been no showing that authority to deviate from the terms 33
this trust is necessary to effectuate the ultimate intention of the testator."
With the attitudes of the courts just cited, compare those below
described for example in Nebraska, where a home for poor working
girls was involved, maintenance and operation of which was provided
for out of a trust established in a will executed in 1904. It appeared
that the average interest yield on book value of the trust investments
had declined from 10.19 per cent in 1916 to 2.55 per cent in 1940, and
that the home was running at a deficit. Deviation was permitted, with
these comments:
"The secondary restriction on investments made in the will and in the
authority given the trustee by the court must yield to the primary purpose of the trust, which is the effective operation of the home. The
primary object is to preserve the trust property so that it may be used to
the greatest advantage of the beneficiaries. This property must produce
an income. To do so it must be safely invested in productive property. The
present base ... is shown to be inadequate to the need. The broader base
proposed permits a wider diversification of investments, assuring a better
balanced investment of the funds of the trust and should tend to safeguard
the preservation of the principal fund."34
31. National Newark & Essex Banking Co. v. Osborne, 16 N.J. Super 142,
84 A.2d 38 (1951).
32. In re Jones' Will, 221 Minn. 524, 22 N.W.2d 633, 634 (1946), quoting 54
Am. Jua., Trusts § 285 (1945). See also the earlier case with the identical
style at 202 Minn. 187, 277 N.W. 899 (1938).
33. In re Jones' Will, 221 Minn. 524, 22 N.W.2d 633, 635 (1946).
34. Creighton v. Waltman, 140 Neb. 3,"299 N.W. 261,266 (1941).
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And in New York, once the statutes had been amended so that a uniform, and, what may have been even more important, a statutory,
uniform standard of prudence was established with respect to investments made outside the old legal list, we find evidence of changed
judicial attitudes. For example,
"testator showed his keen business acumen in realizing that what corpus
might be sufficient when the will was made might not be adequate when
he died, or in later years when conditions might materially change. His
first thought, therefore, must have been to insure adequate support for
his widow under the standards when he fixed at $7500.00 per year. [At
the time of trial, income from the trust had declined to $5000.00 annually.]
...It was impossible in 1930 for any person to have forseen[sic] the
changes and developments which were to take place either in general
inflation or in the continued successful expansion of the Corning Glass
Works.... Section 21, Subd. I(m) of the Personal Property Law seems to
be designed among other purposes to assist situations such as this and
of the times
make it possible for a cestui que trust to combat the inflation
35
without jeopardizing the securities for the remaindermen."
In another recent New York case, granting relief, the court com-

mented that events had moved in such a way as to "narrow the trustees' investment field to an extent that the testator could not have contemplated."3 6 Earlier, in a case where the trust instrument authorized
investment outside the legal New York list, the court remarked, in
refusing to surcharge the trustee,
"He must, however, exercise reasonable care and prudence. Those on
their face are terms which may be thought irritatingly vague, but in their
practical operation they reflect a recognizable standard.... As the learned
referee has stated in his opinion, an imprudent investment even in legals
and under an investment clause conferring broad discretionary powers

is not justified."37
The foregoing sample collection of cases, typical of many more on
both sides of the debate, shows more clearly than any citation of textbook authority that the legal list cannot accomodate itself - or only
too tardily at best- to changing conditions which may defeat or impair the purposes and gifts of a trust. It also shows that the rule of prudence .does, as Justice Rugg said in Kimbali v. Whitney 38 thirty-four
years ago, adapt itself to "new financial institutions and customs." Since
King v. Talbot39 laid down the New York rule the tendency of courts
in the legal list states has generally been to regard common stocks as
35. In re Sinclaire's Will, 203 Misc. 56, 116 N.Y.S.2d 624, 626 (Surr. Ct. 1952).
36. In Te Daly's Estate, 203 Misc. 851, 120 N.Y.S.2d 896, 900 (Surr. Ct. 1953).
37. In re City Bank Farmers Trust Co., 68 N.Y.S.2d 43, 46-47 (Sup. Ct. 1947).
38. 233 Mass. 321, 331, 123 N.E. 665, 666 (1919).
39. 40 N.Y.76 (1869).
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that earlier court (and later the legislature) did; that is, as speculative
essentially, by their very nature.40 Accordingly, as we have seen, the
result, and the logical result was to shrink from authorizing investments outside the statute when the investment powers in the trust
instrument seemed to be restricted to the "legal" class, and also when
the question was as to departure from individual and specially phrased
language. On the other hand, one frequently finds that these same
courts point out the applicability of the rule of prudence, not merely
in cases involving discretionary investment powers 4' but also in
situations where the fiduciary is acting under the legal list statute.
Thus,
"The statutory authority to invest trust funds was never intended to act
as a cloak exculpating trustees from the performance of their duties as
prudent men." 42
"The fiduciary who invests in securities within the specified classes is not
by the statutes freed from liability for resultant losses if he fails to exer43
cise reasonable judgment and discretion in making the investment."
So, as we have seen, though the divergence between the New York
and Massachusetts rules, as applied to investment in stocks, remained
the principal point at issue for many years, in other respects affecting
the duties of trustees there were very considerable areas of agreement.
There had been in the early days, even in New England, a residual
worry (noted by Torrance in his excellent article) 44 where the court
said
"the question as to what are good and proper securities is left somewhat
at large, and must be conceded to be not without its difficulties."45
Torrance goes on to say
"here, incidentally, we have in large part the explanation of our legal
lists. It was to resolve just such questions that some states deemed it advisable to set precise statutory standards for trust investments. They had
their uses during a certain stage of our economic development, but more
and more, as we shall see later, they are passing from the scene." 46
40. Fidelity Union Trust Co. v. Price, 18 N.J. Super 578, 87 A.2d 565, 569
(1952), citing Gray v. Fox, 1 N.J. Eq. 259 (1831), saying, "The stock of private
companies is not considered safe."
41. In re Leonard's Will, 118 Misc. 598, 193 N.Y. Supp. 916 (Surr. Ct. 1922);
In re Hall, 164 N.Y. 196, 200, 58 N.E. 11, 12 (1900).
42. In re Doyle's Will, 191 Misc. 860, 79 N.Y.S.2d 695, 697 (Surr. Ct. 1948).
43. In re Weinz' Will, 65 N.Y.S.2d 302 (Surr. Ct. 1946).
44. Torrance, supra note 2, at 133-34.
45. Kimball v. Reding, 31 N.H. 352, 374, 64 Am. Dec. 333, 336-37 (1855).
46. Torrance, supra note 2, at 134.
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Before passing on to other considerations, it will be appropriate to
observe that, while we have been concerned so far mainly with the
Prudent Man Rule as affecting the trustee's acquisition of investments,
it does in actuality, cover many other phases of his activities. Shattuck
annotated the Rule as construed in Massachusetts very carefully taking
the phrases directly from the Harvard College v. Amory opinion, and
remarked that one of the virtues of the Rule was its "consistency with
the general body of law governing trust administration." 47 Among
other matters taken account of by the Massachusetts courts and referred to in Shattuck's article were: duty of loyalty, purchase of
improper investments, failure to diversify, undue retention of investments, failure to make trust property productive, failure to supervise
agents employed in the business of the trust, commingling of trust assets, duty not to delegate, duty not to speculate (including transactions
entered into for a quick turnover or profit), duty of impartiality (including purchase or retention of wasting, unproductive or unproductive
property), deviation from terms of the trust instrument, etc. As to
this last matter, Shattuck cites cases where, contrary to the frequent
practice in legal list states, trustees' powers, where narrower than the
standard, have been broadened by court decree. 48
It was no doubt due to his consciousness of the extent to which and
the period of time over which the Prudent Man Rule had been construed in his native state that led Shattuck, as adviser and draftsman
for the Trust Division of American Bankers Association, to use Justice
Putnam's words as the effective heart of the Model Statute, later to be
adopted by so many states. The statutory embodiment of these oftconstrued words should obviously be of great assistance to both courts
and trustees in states where cases under the Rule might often be ones
of first impression.
The Tennessee Prudent Man statute, 49 varies very slightly from the
Model Act. As is the case in other states adopting the Model Act,
provision is made not only with respect to acquiring, investing, reinvesting, exchanging, selling and managing trust property, but also
with respect to retaining it. Further, there is a provision with respect
to the power of a court to authorize deviation from terms of the trust.
In some states special statutes now exist, stating conditions under
which deviation may be permitted, 0 quite probably in reflection of the
difficulties experienced by trustees and beneficiaries alike.
47. Shattuck, The Massachusetts Prudent Man in Trust Investments, 25
B.U.L. REV. 307, 312 (1945).
48. Id. at 340 n.137, citing Estate John P. Monks, Sup. Jud. Ct., Suffolk
County, Docket No. 61020 Eq.; and Estate of Wm.B. Rice, Norfolk County
Probate Ct., Docket No. 44455.
49. Tenn. Pub. Acts 1951, c. 125.
50. LA. REv. STAT. §§ 9:1942 and 9:1275 (1950); N.H. REV. LAws c. 371, § 4
(1942); N.J. STAT. ANw.§ 3A:15-15 (1953); N.D. REV. CoDE § 59-0415 (1943);

VT. Ry. STAT. § 3127 (1947).
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The Tennessee statute also gives attention to two other matters
not covered by all (though treated by some) of the model statutes
enacted in other states, and includes among the enumerated kinds of
investments both common trust funds and investment trusts and
companies. Inclusion of these items was in recognition of discussion
prevalent for some years of the alleged improper delegation and commingling involved in purchases of such property. As to common trust
funds, a number of decisions have placed them within the definition of
"securities" and, when appropriate, as legal investments. 1 The socalled delegation involved in the purchase of investment company
shares by fiduciaries, in the debate concerning which the present writer
took part, was denied, however, in two cases, including one under the
Model Prudent Man Statute in Oklahoma, where the statute did not
mention investment company shares.5 2 In Massachusetts, in 1948, sixteen of the twenty Probate Judges in their annual meeting addressed
a letter to Shattuck stating that fiduciary purchases of investment
company shares "are not such a delegation of authority on the part
of a trustee as would warrant an objection on that score alone."
The wide popularity and distribution of investment company shares,
and the substantial amount of money invested therein (currrently
estimated at nearly $4,000,000,000), have brought about considerable
judicial and legal attention. At the present writing eleven out of the
group of thirty-two states and one territory having the Prudent Man
Rule in whole or in part, have statutory provisions specifically mentioning investment company shares. Of the seven legal list states
whose statutes permit stock purchases under certain restrictions two
include investment company shares. It now appears, as Shattuck
is
stated, that "the standard laid down by Harvard College v. Amory
53
destined to be the American trustee's guide for years to come.1
It will still be subject, and should, if it is to live, continue to be subject to searching analysis and debate. There will always be the
question, "Who is the Prudent Man?" And, as long as our society
continues to grow more instead of less complex, we can expect a
continuation of the argument as to the precise nature of the trustee
as conserver. What does he conserve, res or quantum? Quantum or
51. In re Peck's Estate, 199 Misc. 1051, 101 N.Y.S.2d 288 (Surr. Ct. 1950);
In re Hoaglund's Estate, 74 N.Y.S.2d 156 (Surr. Ct. 1947).
52. In re Rees' Estate, 53 Ohio L. Abst. 385, 85 N.E.2d 563 (Ct. App. 1949),
affirming 53 Ohio L. Abst. 513, 87 N.E.2d 937 (Prob. Ct. 1947); In re Flynn's
Estate, 205 Okla. 311, 237 P.2d 903 (1951). See also STEVENSON, ALEc B., SHARES
IN MUTuAL INmSTMENT FuxDs (1946); STEVENSON, ALEc B., INVESTMENT COMPANY SHARES (1947); Stevenson, Alec B., Investment Company Shares, 89
TRUSTS & ESTATES 228 (1950).

53. Shattuck, The Development of the Prudent Man Rule for Fiduciary
Investment in the United States in the Twentieth Century, 12 Omo Sr. L.J.
491, 504 (1951).
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value (purchasing power) ? Can the prudent trustee be both cautious
54
and aggressive? What is "security"?
SUiAMARY
The emphasis in this paper upon cases having to do with deviation
from the terms of the trust is deliberate, because they so well illustrate
both the value of the flexibility inherent in the Prudent Man Rule, and,
also, draw attention to the circumstances with which the working
trustee is all too familiar. Despite all the organized efforts made in
the past, one suspects that the cumulative plaints of income beneficiaries have had more to do with liberalizing the investment powers
of the trustee than any other one cause. When Mrs. Jones says, "Henry
left this money to take care of me. Why can't you do it, like you and
both know he meant you to do?", there is all too often a legally correct answer but still none that is satisfactory to Mrs. Jones.
In the legal list states the answer of the courts has often been,
to paraphrase that of the New Jersey court quoted earlier, 5 "The principal is intact, even though the income has shrunk." The nub of the
position of the Prudent Man advocates, accordingly, has been, "There
are other kinds of sound investments available, which often pay
greater income." It is true, as Torrance states that
"To begin with, the position of the trustee as a conserver, rather than
a creator, of capital, as indicated in the cases cited, is not just an accident
or a whim. There are excellent practical as well as legal reasons why the
emphasis is where it is. If we lose principal, we generally lose income,
sometimes permanently."6
However, Torrance does not fall into the error of assuming either
that preservation of principal lies only in the closest possible approximation to riskless investment, or that common stocks and other equitytype investments are never suitable as permanent trust investments.
His penetrating comments5 7 are worth careful study, particularly as
regards purchasing power, inflation and the "growth" element in
stocks, and they supplement the conclusions of the New York Trust
Investment Study Committee, of which he was a leading member.
The report of that committee, though it recommended that purchases
outside the old list be limited to 35% of the value of a trust estate,
rather eloquently said
54. For thoughtful comments on these and allied questions see Headley,
Trustees as Conservators,29 TRUST BULL. No. 7, p. 15 (March, 1950); Headley,
Trustees or "Gentlemen Adventurers?", 88 TRusTs & ESTATES 91 (1949); Shattuck and Headley, Whither Trusteeship, 89 TRuSTS & ESTATES 92 (1950).
55. National Newark &Essex Banking Co. v. Osborne, 16 N.J. Super. 142, 84
A.2d 38 (1951).
56. Torrance, supra note 2, at 134.
57. Id. at 143-152.
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"the plain fact is that prudent men do buy stocks. The prudent man buys
them with discretion, after due investigation, 'with a view to the probable
income as well as the probable safety of the capital to be invested.' He
buys stocks that he is willing to consider permanent investments, in so far
as anyone can judge the future, without any false notions or exaggerated
hopes as to what they are or what they can do ..... He avoids new, weak,
or untried situations; he knows he must seek these stocks which deserve
the confidence of investors. He does not expect any insurance or guarantee
of purchasing power, for he knows there is no consistent parallel between
stock prices and living costs."58
Many studies of the investment merits of stocks vs. bonds have been
made, and opinion now can be fairly said to accept the notion that,
despite a greater tendency to fluctuate in quoted value (and, of course,
in income), common stocks carefully selected and carefully watched,
constitute a desirable complement to fixed-income investments in a
trust portfolio.59
The realization has come that while, as Torrance states, loss of
principal usually means loss of income, failure to maintain income
(i.e., failure to provide continuous investment analysis) often means
loss of principal. Investment analysis will frequently show that appraisal of corporate management is as important in evaluation of bonds
as of stocks, or, as is frequently said, plant and equipment in themselves do not guarantee safety, even when pledged under mortgage.
The Director of Trust Studies, The Graduate School of Banking,
American Bankers Association, himself a lawyer and a former trust
officer, observed last year:
"The method of the common law trust requires a permanent source of
income and a continuous flow. The permanent source is provided by
placing a capital fund in the hands of a trustee. The trustee is charged
with a duty to preserve its dollar value.... The duty of the trustee, therefore, is two-fold: He must preserve the principal, for out of it flows the
income; and he must so invest principal that the flow will be ample and
continuous. Source and flow must be kept in balance. Principal must
not be unduly risked to enlarge the flow; nor must the income be less
than is consistent with the safety of the source.... in fact the chief purpose in maintaining a principal intact is to insure a steady flow of spending money to the dependent family.... What, then, of common stocks? ...
some of them have demonstrated, over a long period of years,6 0 the
qualities required for sound permanent investments. Intrinsic values have
been maintained and dividends have been adequate and regular. The
principal has been reasonably safe for a number of reasons: competent
58. REPORT OF THE TRUST INVESTMENT STUDY COMMITTEE, op. cit. supra note
15, at 106.
59. COWLES, COMMON STOCK INDEXES (1939); SCULLY, THE PURCHASE OF ComMON STOCKS AS TRUST INVESTMENTS (1937); Scully, WVvh Common Stocks for
Trust Funds, 71 TRUSTS & ESTATES 294 (1940).
60. For a list of common stocks with long dividend records, see REPORT OF
THE TRUST INVESTMENT STUDY COMMITTEE, op. cit. supra note 15, at 131-162.
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management, sound financing, position in an essential industry, a success-

ful record and an adequate market." 61

For many years the attitude of the law, of trustees and of testators
themselves was prejudiced in favor of the remaindermen, and economic and social conditions favored the trend. Reversal came about at
the instance of trustees and testators, plus the beneficiaries of income,
though actual results of maintaining more productive portfolios may in
the end benefit remaindermen as well. There is no sign that trustees
newly liberated are rushing into speculative courses of action, and if
they do err on the side of risk taken deliberately or negligently, then
court precedents under the Prudent Man Rule certainly hold little
comfort for them. As to the courts, the record in the older Prudent
Man states affords little grounds for belief that an ignorant and inexperienced judge may often do serious damage either to the trustee
or his beneficiaries. However, as Shattuck has stated, the judge in a
state having newly adopted the Rule has "a difficult task before him...
he will need to acquaint himself with the oft expressed considerate
attitude of the Massachusetts high court toward the problems of the
trustee. '62 We have seen, on the other hand, that even courts in legal
list states, when faced with a decision under the rule of prudence,
seem to have been able to hand down opinions consonant with its
principles and its spirit. To the problem of the ignorant and incompetent trustee there may be a more uncertain answer, though it does
seem fair to say that most testators and trustors having sufficient
property to consider setting up a trust are likely to consult a good
attorney, either directly or in collaboration with a trust institution,
and will be advised of the perils of appointing an inexperienced fiduciary. With investment information much more accessible than in
other years, there is less and less reason, if there ever was a good one,
for a too timid and underproductive trust investment policy.62a The
recognition of the changed circumstances of modem times has even
appeared in legislative acts themselves, as witness the preamble to the
New Mexico statute:
"The legislature, mindful of the fact that a fiduciary needs the power to
acquire and hold diverse types of securities and property at various times
and under varying economic conditions to best serve the beneficiaries or
wards in providing income and preserving the trust or guardianship
63
estate .... "

61. Headley, Trust Investments, 90 TRUSTS & ESTATES 739, 739-741 (1952).
See also Headley, A Trustee in a World of Changing Values, 5 LAw & COx-

TEMP. PrOB. 355 (1938).

62. Shattuck, The Massachusetts Prudent Man in Trust Investments, 25
B.U.L. REv. 307, 346 (1945).
62a. Matthew, XXV, 14-30.
63. N.M. Laws 1951, c. 41.
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Trusteeship, dealing always and at close range with human beings,
is an art and not a science, and nowhere more so than where the matter
of concern is the proper investment of trust property. Investment itself is merely an art, however much its practitioners may be aided by
the elaborate factual analyses, ratios and carefully determined factors
of safety which are supplied by the numerous and excellent financial
statistical publishing houses, metropolitan trust institutions, investment counsel firms, investment bankers and the like. These, carefully
,constructed out of the records of the past, are the indispensable raw
materials for the trustee's judgment, but cannot, save at his peril, be
used as a substitute for it. That judgment must impartially correlate
and compare past and present, and even, though eschewing prophecy,
look also toward the future. These continuous and progressive acts of
judgment no legislature, unless in constant session, is equipped to perform, as witness the record of failure in adaptation to changed circumstances. As was said by a Pennsylvania court
"We must think in terms of business cycles, of the return as well as the
ebbing of values, and of the cause of this. Fiduciaries cannot be put in a
vacuum and set apart from other investors. They too must scan the turbulent horizon of our financial and industrial life and do the best they can." 64
If they are really to "do the best they can" and are to be held responsible, it would be strange, indeed, in a country such as this, whose
genius has lain not in totalitarian proscriptions and controls but in the
creation and defense of free institutions by free men, had trustees not
eventually been given that opportunity to choose which is the precondition of effective action and, indeed, of freedom itself. No one,
to be sure, would argue seriously that human freedom is or should be
absolute under any conditions of which we know. But an increase in
relative freedom is one of the marks of an advancing civilization, just
as a continuance of deterministic custom and law is a mark of primitive
peoples.
"The beginning of civilization is marked by an intense legality; that legality is the very condition of its existence, the bond which ties it together;
but that legality -that tendency to impose a settled customary yoke upon
all men and all actions, if it goes on, kills the variability implanted by
nature, and makes different men and different ages facsimilies of other
men and other ages, as we see them often."65
Nowhere is that variability more apparent than in the confused
inAt6play of economic and social forces which the trustee must appraise and with which he must contend. If, having observed in the
64. In re Carwithen's Estate, 327 Pa. 490, 495, 194 At. 743 (1937).
65. BAGEHOT, PHYSICS AND PoLiTics 64 (1873).
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records the history of the inception, growth, maturity and decay of
whole industries, he is bound alike to continue in the old pattern, and
to shun the new even when proven, then his powers are stultified and
his work is of little value to those whom he serves. How much better
to let him be guided, if he is a man of conscience - and he should be by some very old advice.
"He himself made man from the beginning,

And left him in the hand of his own counsel.
If thou wilt, thou shalt keep the commandments;
And to perform faithfulness is of thine own good pleasure.
He hath set fire and water before thee:
Thou shalt stretch forth thine hand unto whichsoever thou wilt."66

APPENDIX
A. The Prudent Man States (prior to 1940)
1939

Connecticut

1890 Kentucky
1884
1830
1937
1940

Maryland
Massachusetts
Michigan
Missouri

1928

North Carolina

1886
1908

Rhode Island
Vermont

CoNN. GEN. STAT. § 6893 (1949), as amended by Pub.
Acts 1953, 101.
Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 386.020 (Baldwin Cum. Supp.
1953).
McCoy v. Horwitz, 62 Md. 183 (1884).
Harvard College v. Amory, 9 Pick. 446 (Mass. 1830).
Mzcu. COMp. LAWS § 487.232 (1948).
Rand v. McKittrick, 346 Mo. 466, 142 S.W.2d 29
(1940).
Sheets v. J. G. Flynt Tobacco Co., 195 N.C. 149, 145
S.E. 355 (1928).
Peckham v. Newton, 15 R.I. 321 (1886).
Scoville v. Brock, 81 Vt. 405, 70 Atl. 1014 (1908).

The Prudent Man Rule States, by Statute (after 1940) in some form or
other, 100 per cent or less
*1941 New Hampshire N.H. REv. LAWs c. 342, § 22 (1942), as amended by
Laws 1945 c. 363, § 17, and Laws 1949, c. 134, § 1-50%.
CAL. Cv. CoDE § 2261 (1949) -100%.
1943 California
DEL. REV. CODE C. 117, § 35 (1935), as amended by
1943 Delaware
Laws 1943, c. 171, and Laws 1947, c. 268-100%.
MNN. STAT. § 501.125 (1949) - 1009.
1943 Minnesota
ILL. REV. STAT. C. 148, §§ 32 to 32.1c (Supp. 1952) 1945 Illinois
100%.
ME. REV. STAT. c. 147, §§ 17a-17d (1944), as amended,
"1945 Maine
Laws 1951, c. 24 - 100%.
TEX. REV. Crv. STAT. ANN. art. 7425b-46 (1951) -100%.
1945 Texas
1947 Nevada
NEv. Come. LAws §§ 7718.55-57 (Supp. 1949) - 100%.
ORE.Comp. LAWS ANN.§§ 73-103a to 73-103d (Supp.
1947 Oregon
1947), as amended, Ore. Laws 1949, c. 220, § 1 - 100%.
HAwA. REv. LAws § 8661 (1945), as amended, Series
1947 Hawaii
C-147: Act 125, 1947- 100%, applying to trust cornpanies only.
*1947 Washington
Wash. Laws 1947, c. 100 - 100%.
Idaho Laws 1949, c. 36 - 100%.
1949 Idaho

B.

66. Ecclesiasticus,XV.
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1949

Kansas

1949
1951
*1951

Oklahoma
Utah

*1951
*1951
*1951
*1951

New Mexico
Tennessee
New Jersey
North Dakota

Colorado

*1951 South Carolina
1951 West Virginia

*1953 Ohio
1953 Florida
C.
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(1949), as
amended, Laws, 1951, c. 209, § 1 - 100%.
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 60, § 161 (1951) -100%.
UTAH CODE ANN. § 33-2-1 (1953) - 100%.
COLO. STAT. ANN. c. 176, §§ 126(5)-(10) (Supp. 1952)
-1009.
N.M. Laws 1951, c. 41 - 100%.
Tenn. Pub. Acts 1951, c. 125 - 100%.
N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 3.16-4.3 (Supp. 1951) -40%.
N.D. REV. CODE § 6-0504- 6-0515 (1943), as amended,
Laws 1951, c. 103-50% rule applying to corporate
Jiduciariesonly.
S.C. CODE § 67-58 (1952) - 30%.
W. VA. CODE ANN. § 4216(1) (2) (1949), as amended,
Acts 1951, c. 2, adding section 2a applying only to
charitable, educational, religious institutions, etc. 100%.
OHio CODE ANN. § 2109.371 (Supp. 1953) - 35%.
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 518.01 (1943), as amended, Laws
1953, c. 28154- 100%.
KAN. GEN. STAT. §§ 17-5003 to 17-5007

The Legal List States (of various types)
(1) States which do not permit investment in equities in any form
Alabama
Arkansas
Georgia
Iowa
Louisiana
Montana
Wyoming

States in which eligible equities must meet prescribed tests, and in
addition limit the amount which may be invested in equities
District of Columbia Rule 23, Local Civil Rules of Dist. Ct.
IND. ANN. STAT. § 31-501 (Burns 1949).
Indiana
NEB. REV. STAT. § 24-601 (Supp. 1947) (Not
*Nebraska
over 30% of a trust in stocks, including investment company shares, and in no event
over 20% in investment company shares, all
as set forth in the statute, and only with
court approval).
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, §§ 821.1-821.20 (1950),
*Pennsylvania
as amended, Acts 1951, No. 340, and 1953,
S.B. 203.
VA. CODE § 26-40 (1950), as amended, Acts
Virginia
1952, c. 196 (preferred stocks only). But see
Powell, The Virginia Prudent Man Rule of
Trust Investments, 34 VA. L. REV. 102 (1948),
where the author argues that the Prudent
Man Rule is in effect in Virginia, statutes to
the contrary notwithstanding.
WIs. STAT. § 320.01 (1945), as amended, Laws
*Wisconsin
1951, c. 404, and Laws 1953, c. 164, § 1.
(3) States which have no specifically declared fiduciary law (fiduciaries
do not usually purchase equities without specific authorization in the
governing instrument)
Arizona
Mississippi
South Dakota
* States marked thus permit the purchase of investment company shares,
sometimes with and sometimes without limitations.
(2)

